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We present a new empirical decomposition of the effects of financial liberalization on economic growth
and on the incidence of crises. Our empirical estimates show that the direct effect of financial liberalization
on growth by far outweighs the indirect effect via a higher propensity to crisis. We also discuss several
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There are two contrasting views of ﬁnancial liberalization. In one view, ﬁnancial liberalization
strengthens ﬁnancial development and contributes to higher long-run growth. In another
view, liberalization induces excessive risk-taking, increases macroeconomic volatility and
leads to more frequent crises.
In this paper we propose an empirical framework that brings these two views together.
We decompose the impact of international ﬁnancial liberalization on growth into two eﬀects:
a positive direct eﬀect and a negative indirect eﬀect through a higher propensity to crisis.
We ﬁnd that the direct growth gain of ﬁnancial liberalization signiﬁcantly outweighs the
growth loss associated with more frequent ﬁnancial crises. On net, the eﬀect of ﬁnancial
liberalization on growth is economically sizeable: around 1% increase in per-capita annual
growth rate.
The eﬀect of ﬁnancial liberalization on growth and its impact on ﬁnancial fragility and the
propensity to crises have been largely studied in separate strands of the empirical literature.
The ﬁnancial crisis literature tests whether ﬁnancial liberalization increase the risk of ﬁnan-
cial crises. Kaminsky and Reinhart (1998), Detragiache and Demirguc-Kunt (1998), Glick
a n dH u t c h i n s o n( 2 0 0 1 )ﬁnd that the propensity to banking and currency crises increases
in the aftermath of ﬁnancial liberalization. In contrast, the literature on liberalization and
growth focuses on identifying the eﬀects of liberalization on average long-run growth. For
instance, Bekaert, Harvey and Lundblad (2005) ﬁnd that stock makert liberalization leads
to an increase of one percentage point in average GDP growth.1 Henry (2000) conﬁrms this
result at the ﬁrm level by showing that ﬁnancial liberalization leads to an investment boom
associated with a decline in the cost of capital.
The goal of this paper is not to perform another test of the eﬀect of ﬁnancial liberal-
ization on growth. Instead, its main contribution is to develop an integrated framework
to empirically quantify and contrast the dual eﬀects of ﬁnancial liberalization:o nt h eo n e
hand, ﬁnancial liberalization tends to relax borrowing constraints, leading to higher invest-
ment and higher average growth; on the other hand, it encourages risk-taking, generates
ﬁnancial fragility and increases the probability of ﬁnancial crises, which often have severe
1They also identify a similar growth eﬀect of capital account liberalization using a measure of the intensity
of capital account openness proposed by Quinn (1997).Figure 1: Thailand vs. India: Credit and Growth (1980-2002)





















Note: The values for 1980 are normalized to one.  
Source: Ranciere-Tornell and Westermann (2003) 
recessionary consequences.
The contrasting experiences of Thailand and India illustrate the dual eﬀects of ﬁnancial
liberalization. Thailand, a ﬁnancially liberalized economy, has experienced lending booms
and crises, while India, a non-liberalized economy, has followed a slow but safe growth path
(see Figure 1). In India GDP per capita grew by only 99% between 1980 and 2001, whereas
Thailand’s GDP per capita grew by 148%, despite having experienced a major crisis.
We believe that analyzing the eﬀects of ﬁnancial liberalization in a uniﬁed way is impor-
tant. The division of the empirical literature on ﬁnancial liberalization between the analysis
of the crises and the growth eﬀects has several disadvantages. First, each strand provides
only a partial account on the eﬀect of ﬁnancial liberalization. The crisis view stresses the
severity of the output costs of ﬁnancial crises, but largely ignores its growth beneﬁts during
tranquil times. The growth view relies on the estimation of linear growth eﬀects of ﬁnancial
liberalization. This linear approach captures only the “average” growth eﬀect across the
booms and busts generated by ﬁnancial liberalization. The second disadvantage is that each
strand has produced its own set of policy implications. Researchers emphasizing the long-run
growth eﬀect advocate ﬁnancial liberalization policies, while researchers that concentrate on
crises caution against excessive ﬁnancial liberalization.Section 2 contains our empirical ﬁndings. Section 3 discusses theoretical mechanisms
consistent with our empirical results. Section 4 concludes.
2 Financial Liberalization, Crises and Growth: an em-
pirical decomposition
We propose a methodology to decompose the eﬀect of ﬁnancial liberalization on growth into
two channels: a direct growth channel and an indirect fragility channel. The latter eﬀect
captures a higher frequency of crises and the associated costs in terms of lower growth. The
main advantage of this approach is that it allows us to quantitatively compare the expected
growth beneﬁts of ﬁnancial liberalization in normal times with the growth costs stemming
from a greater vulnerability to crises.
2.1 Empirical Methodology
Our empirical strategy consists of adding to a standard growth regression a ﬁnancial liber-
alization dummy and a ﬁnancial crisis dummy. Furthermore, we treat the ﬁnancial crisis
dummy as an endogenous variable that depends on several variables including ﬁnancial lib-
eralization. In this set-up, the impact of ﬁnancial liberalization on growth is composed of
two eﬀects: (i) a direct eﬀect on growth conditional on a standard set of control variables
a n do nt h ea b s e n c eo fﬁnancial crisis, and (ii) an indirect eﬀect reﬂecting the growth costs
associated with a higher propensity to ﬁnancial crises.
Formally, the empirical speciﬁcation combines a growth model and a crisis model.T h e
growth model has the following panel form with i indexing the country and t indexing the
time period :
yi,t = αXi,t + βFLi,t + γI
crisis
i,t + εi,t, (1)
where yi,t is real per-capita GDP growth, Xi,t is a set of control variables standard in the
growth literature, FLi,t is a dummy for ﬁnancial liberalization , and Icrisis
i,t is a dummy
variable taking on a value of one if country i experiences a ﬁnancial crisis in period t and
zero otherwise. Lastly, εi,t is a random component.The crisis model treats the crisis dummy Icrisis
i,t as an endogenous variable which depends
o nt h er e a l i z a t i o no fa nu n o b s e r v e dl a t e n tv a r i a b l eW∗













jt = aZi,t + bFLi,t + ηit.
The latent variable I∗
jt is assumed to depend linearly on a set of control variables Zi,t,o nt h e
ﬁnancial liberalization dummyFLi,t and on a random component ηit. Under the assumption







1 with probability :Pr(W∗
it > 0) = Φ(aZi,t + bFLi,t)
0 with probability: Pr(W∗
it ≤ 0) = 1 − Φ(aZi,t + bFLi,t)
where Φ is the cumulative distribution function of a standard normal. Thus, the parameters
of the crisis model can be estimated using a probit model.
Notice that the mixed model described by (1)-(2) is equivalent to a treatment eﬀects
model for which standard estimation techniques have been developed (see Heckman (1978)
and Maddala (1993)).
Estimation Procedure
In the treatment eﬀects model representation, the crisis dummy captures the “treatment”,
the growth regression (1) is the “outcome” equation and regression (2) is the “treatment”
equation representing the likelihood to receive the treatment.2 As shown by Maddala (1983),
the model can be consistently estimated using a two-step procedure under the assumption
that the error terms εi,t and ηit are bivariate normal but not independent. In the ﬁrst step,
one obtains probit estimates of the probability of crisis:
Pr(I
crisis
i,t =1 )=P r ( W
∗
it > 0) = Φ(azi,t + bFLi,t) (3)
where Φ is the standard normal cumulative distribution function. Using the probit estimates
2Edwards (2004) us a similar framework to assess the impact of a sudden stop on growth, as do Razin
and Rubinstein (2004) to study the growth eﬀect of exchange rate regimes in the presence of a currency
crisis.(b a,b b), one computes a hazard hi,t for each observation.3 In the second step, one obtains con-
sistent estimates for the parameters (α,β,γ) of the growth model by augmenting regression
(1) with the hazard hi,t.4
The total eﬀect of ﬁnancial liberalization, the impact of a change in the ﬁnancial liberal-
ization dummy from zero to one, is the sum of a direct eﬀect (γ) a n da ni n d i r e c te ﬀect due
to a change in the probability of crisis:
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As discussed in the introduction, the existing empirical literature on ﬁnancial liberal-
ization has focused either on the estimation of variations of the growth model, using linear
techniques, or on the estimation of the crisis model using a probit speciﬁcation. In contrast,
our procedure allows us to jointly estimate the linear growth regression model and the probit
model of crisis.
Based on the literature, e.g. Bekaert and Harvey (2005) and Kaminsky and Reinhart
(2000), our prior is that the direct eﬀect of ﬁnancial liberalization on growth is positive ,
while the indirect eﬀect — via a greater likelihood of crisis — is negative.
T h en o n - l i n e a r i t yo ft h ep r o b i ts p e c i ﬁcation is, in principle, suﬃcient to identify the model
and, in particular, to distinguish the direct from the indirect eﬀect of ﬁnancial liberalization.
However, Arellano (2006) shows that such an empirical strategy is likely to result in weak
identiﬁcation. Hence, we introduce in the probit regression some variables that are excluded





φ(b azi,t+b bFLi,t)/Φ(b azi,t+b bFLi,t) if Ii,t =1
−φ(b azi,t+b bFLi,t)/
n
(1 − Φ(b azi,t+b bFLi,t)
o
if Ii,t =0
where φ and Φ are the density and cumulative distribution of the standard normal density function
4An alternative is to use a maximum likelihood procedure to estimate the model (1)-(2) jointly. For
details, see Maddala (1983) or Wooldridge (2002).from the growth regression.5,6
The selection of the probit model speciﬁcation is done using the Aikaike information
criterion. In the probit equation we initially include , along with the ﬁnancial liberalization
dummy, all the control variables from the growth regression and the excluded variables in
their the ﬁrst, second and third lags. We then select the speciﬁcation that minimizes the
Aikaike criterion. Finally, the standard errors in both the growth estimates and the probit
estimates are clustered at the country level and are adjusted to be robust to heteroskedas-
ticity.
The speciﬁcation of the growth model and the crisis model at the same annual frequency
is convenient for the estimation. A disadvantage is that the estimation of the growth equation
using annual data does not allow us to ﬁlter out ﬂuctuations at the business cycle frequency.
To deal with this issue, we modify the model to combine a growth equation estimated using
ﬁve-year averages with a probit crisis model estimated at an annual frequency. The ﬁrst
step of the estimation - the probit regression - is identical, but the second step is modiﬁed
to take into account the possibility that a country is hit by a crisis in any given year during
the ﬁve-year interval.
2.2 Data
The sample consists of a set of sixty countries for which we have information on the dates
of ﬁnancial crises and ﬁnancial liberalization over the period 1980-2002. The complete de-
scription of the sources and the construction of the variables used in the regression analysis
are presented in Appendix A.
We use two sources for the dates of ﬁnancial liberalization: a de jure binary indicator
is constructed using the oﬃcial dates of equity market liberalization described in Beckaert
and Harvey (2005), and a de facto binary indicator is based on the identiﬁcation of country-
speciﬁc trend breaks in private capital ﬂows.7 We view these two indicators as providing
complementary information on the process of ﬁnancial liberalization. The de jure indicator
identiﬁes the timing of a formal regulatory change that allows foreign investors to invest in
5The excluded regressors are chosen among variables that have been found to be robust determinants of
crises, but do not seem to have a systematic independent linear eﬀect on growth.
6As a robustness check, we also estimate the treatment eﬀects model without any exclusion restrictions
7See Appendix B for a description of the construction of the de facto index.domestic equity securities. The de facto indicator detects the timing of an actual change
in the pattern of foreign inﬂows and it covers portfolio ﬂows, bank ﬂows and foreign direct
investments. Appendix C presents the dates of liberalization for the countries in the sample.
We chose to focus on ﬁnancial crises that are characterized by the coincidence of a banking
crisis and a currency crisis. The main reason for this is that these so-called "twin" crises
are largely concentrated in ﬁnancially liberalized economies. The Mexican and Asian crises
are the most prominent examples of twin crises but, actually, the incidence of “twin” crises
has been relatively widespread, occurring in such diverse parts of the world as in Latin
America in the early and mid-1980s and in Scandinavia in the early 1990s. The twin crisis
dummy variable is obtained by combining the systemic banking crises indicator of Caprio and
Klingebiel (2003) and the currency crises indicator of Glick and Hutchinson (2001).8 Caprio
and Klingebiel (2003) deﬁne a systemic banking crisis as a situation where the aggregate
value of the banking system liabilities exceeds the value of its assets. Glick and Hutchinson
(2001) construct an indicator of currency crises based on “large” changes in an index of
currency pressure, deﬁned as a weighted average of real exchange rate changes and reserve
losses.9 Appendix C presents the dates of twin crises for the countries in the sample.
The dependent variable in the growth model is computed as the log diﬀerence in real per
capita income. The set of controls for the growth equation is standard and includes initial
per capita income, population growth, government size, trade openness and inﬂation. As
discussed in section 2.1, the list of potential explanatory variables in the probit equation
includes the regressors of the growth equation. It also contains the two following variables
that are excluded from the growth equation: a measure of real exchange rate overvaluation
computed as deviation from a HP trend and the ratio of M2 to reserves. All the variables are
introduced as their ﬁrst, second and third lags. The minimization of the Aikaike criterion
selects the ﬁnal list of crises determinants and the optimal lag structure.
2.3 Estimation Results
The estimation results based on a growth and a crisis model estimated using annual data are
presented in Table 1. The top panel shows the estimates of the growth equation, while the
8We extend the time coverage of the currency crisis indicator to include the period 2000-2002.
9Large changes in exchange rate pressure are deﬁned as changes in the pressure index exceeding the mean
by more than twice the country-speciﬁc standard deviation.bottom panel presents the estimates of the probit equation. Speciﬁcation [1] includes the de
jure ﬁnancial liberalization index, while speciﬁcation [2] includes the de facto liberalization
index.10
The main results can be summarized as follows. First, ﬁnancial liberalization has a direct
positive eﬀect on per capita GDP growth (b β>0). This eﬀect is signiﬁcant at the 1 percent
conﬁdence level in both equations. Its point estimate is very similar for the two liberalization
indices: 1 p e r c e n t a g ep o i n tf o rt h ed ej u r ei n d e xa n d1.1 percentage points for the de facto
index. Second, the incidence of twin crises, estimated through the probit equation, has a
negative impact on growth (b γ<0). The point estimate of b γ —i.e. the reduction in growth
conditional on experiencing a crisis— is in the range (−0.099, −0.11). This range is consistent
with ﬁndings in the crisis literature.
Third, ﬁnancial liberalization signiﬁcantly increases the probability of a twin crisis.11
Real exchange rate overvaluation, inﬂation and openness to trade are also associated with a
higher probability of crisis. As the probit model is non-linear, the partial eﬀect of a change
in one variable on the crisis probability depends on the value of the other variables. For our
purpose, we are interested in the average partial eﬀect of ﬁnancial liberalization on the crisis
probability: E
n
Φ(b azi,t +b b) − Φ(b azi,t)
o
. This measure indicates that ﬁnancial liberalization
is on average associated with an increase in the probability of a twin crisis by 1.45 percentage
point for the de facto index and by 1.93 percentage point for the de jure index.12
We compute the indirect growth cost of ﬁnancial liberalization on annual per capita
GDP growth by multiplying the estimate of the growth cost of a crisis (b γ) by the average
partial eﬀect of ﬁnancial liberalization on the crisis probability (E
n
Φ(b azi,t +b b) − Φ(b azi,t)
o
).
This indirect growth cost ranges from −0.14 to −0.19 percentage points of annual growth,
m e a n i n gt h a ti ti sﬁve to seven times smaller than the direct growth eﬀect.
Table 2 summarizes the decomposition of the eﬀects of ﬁnancial liberalization on growth.
10The selection of the probit model speciﬁcation is done according to the Aikaike criterion which explains
why the set of explanatory variables diﬀers between [1] and [2]. Notice that the ratio of M2/Reserves has
been included in the initial probit equation but has not been selected in the speciﬁcation that minimizes the
Aikaike criterion.
11The estimated diﬀerence in the probability of a twin crisis associated with a change from zero to one
of the ﬁnancial liberalization dummy is given by Φ(b azi,t +b b) − Φ(b azi,t). Hence b b>0 means that ﬁnancial
liberalization increases ceteris paribus the probability of a crisis.
12In our sample the annual unconditional probability of a twin crisis is 2.3%The total growth eﬀect of ﬁnancial liberalization is slightly below 1 percentage point of
annual GDP growth, a magnitude in line with previous estimates in the literature.13
Table 2: Decomposition of the Eﬀects of Financial Liberalization on Growth (I)
(Frequency of the Growth Equation: Annual)
de Jure Index de Facto Index
Direct Growth Eﬀect +1% +1.1%
Indirect Growth Eﬀect −0.14% −0.19%
Total Growth Eﬀect +0.86% +0.91%
χ2 − test :Total Growth Eﬀect 6=0P-value 0.00 0.00
As a ﬁrst robustness test, we check whether our results survive if the growth equation
is estimated using data averaged in ﬁve-year intervals. In Table 3, we present the results of
the estimation of a modiﬁed version of the treatment eﬀects model where the probit crisis
model is estimated at an annual frequency while the growth model is estimated using a panel
of data averaged over ﬁve-year non overlapping intervals.14 The period of estimation covers
1981-2000 and contains four ﬁve-year intervals.
In the ﬁve-year average panel, the index of ﬁnancial liberalization and the index of ﬁnan-
cial crises in the growth equation represent the fraction of years during which a country has
been liberalized or has experienced a crisis within a ﬁve-year interval. Since the two-step
estimates of the growth model in ﬁve-year averages are computed using the results of the
probit model presented in Table 1, we only report the estimates for the growth equation in
Table 3. The results are similar to the ones obt a i n e du s i n gd a t aa ta n n u a lf r e q u e n c y .T h e
direct eﬀect of ﬁnancial liberalization is almost identical while the growth costs of crises are
slightly more pronounced. The growth eﬀect of inﬂation is now insigniﬁcant while the eﬀect
of trade openness becomes stronger. The other regressors have more or less the same impact.
Table 4 presents the decomposition of the eﬀects of ﬁnancial liberalization on growth. In
comparison to the growth model estimated with annual data, both the direct growth beneﬁt
and the indirect growth cost are a little higher but the resulting total eﬀect is very similar
for both the de jure index and the de facto index.
13For instance, Bekaert, Harvey and Lundblad (2005), using a de facto index, ﬁnd that ﬁnancial liberal-
ization leads to a one percentage point increase in annual growth.
14With the exception of the initial level of per capita income in 1980.Table 4: Decomposition of the Eﬀe c t so fF i n a n c i a lL i b e r a l i z a t i o no nG r o w t h( I I )
(Frequency of the Growth Equation: Five-Year Average)
de Jure Index de Facto Index
Direct Growth Eﬀect +1.2% +1.22%
Indirect Growth Eﬀect −0.25% −0.35%
Total Growth Eﬀect +0.95% +0.87%
χ2 − test :Total Growth Eﬀect 6=0P-value 0.00 0.00
As a second robustness check, we introduce the measure of real exchange rate overvalua-
t i o ni nt h eg r o w t he q u a t i o ni ns p e c i ﬁcation [1] in Table 3. As we suppress the only exclusion
restriction, the non-linearity of the probit model becomes the only source of identiﬁcation of
the model. We ﬁnd that the eﬀect of real exchange rate overvaluation on growth is negative
but very small and insigniﬁcant. Our main results survive in this speciﬁcation although both
the direct and the indirect eﬀects of ﬁnancial liberalization on growth are slightly weaker
(+0.94% and −0.13%)
2.4 Country Estimates
To illustrate our results, we now turn to country speciﬁc estimates of the treatment eﬀect
model, restricting the analysis to the subset of countries that experienced ﬁnancial liber-
alization within the sample period. First, we ﬁt the model to the data in order to obtain
the predicted growth rate and the predicted probability of crisis for each country and each
year.15 Second, for each country we compute the mean predicted growth rate and the
mean probability of crisis before and after ﬁnancial liberalization. Using these mean values,
for each country we compute : (i) the predicted change in growth between the pre and
post-liberalization period; and (ii) the predicted change in the indirect growth cost of crisis
between the pre and post-liberalization periods.
The results are presented in Figure 2. For most of the countries, the predicted change
in growth is between 1 and 1.5 percentage points. This change is slightly higher than
the marginal total eﬀect of ﬁnancial liberalization, as it also reﬂects changes in the other
15The model is ﬁtted using the estimation of the treatment model based on the de jure index of ﬁnancial
liberalization (see regression [1], Table 1).regressors, such as an increase in trade openness. In comparison, the predicted change in
the indirect growth cost of a crisis is much smaller, around −0.25 percentage points.16
Finally, Figure 3 contrasts the change in growth between the pre and post-liberalization
period predicted by the treatment eﬀect model with the change observed in the data. Al-
though the empirical model is parsimonious, it does a reasonable job of describing the dif-
ference in growth patterns before and after liberalization. In 15 out of the 25 cases, the
predicted change in growth is closer than one percentage point to the diﬀerential observed
i nt h ed a t a ,a n di ne i g h tc a s e si ti sc l o s e rt h a nh a l fo fap e r c e n t a g ep o i n t .H o w e v e r ,t h e r e
are six cases for which the model predicts an increase in growth while a decrease has been
observed.17
Our key ﬁnding is that the direct positive eﬀect of ﬁnancial liberalization on growth by
far outweighs its indirect eﬀect through a higher propensity for twin crises. In order to
understand this result, one should keep in mind that even in ﬁnancially liberalized countries
crises remain rare events. Therefore, even if crises can have large output consequences
when they occur, their estimated growth eﬀect remains modest. In contrast, since ﬁnancial
liberalization is likely to improve the access to external ﬁnance, it has a ﬁrst order impact
on growth.
3 Theoretical Discussion
What are the theoretical mechanisms that can account for the dual eﬀects of ﬁnancial lib-
eralization observed in the data? In this section, we discuss three models of the eﬀects of
ﬁnancial liberalization that deliver predictions consistent with the empirical ﬁndings pre-
sented in Section 2.
The interaction between ﬁnancial liberalization policies and capital market imperfections
is at the core of the three models. In Ranciere, Tornell, and Westermann (2003), ﬁnancial
16Interestingly, there are several countries, such as Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and Israel, where the pre-
dicted probability of a crisis, and thus the growth cost of crisis, has decreased after ﬁnancial liberalization.
This ﬁnding primarily reﬂects the decrease in the level of inﬂation has decreased in the post-liberalization
period.
17In two cases, Israel and Colombia, the disappointing growth performance can be attributed to political
factors. In the case of Japan, it can be attributed to the long lasting banking crisis of the 90s that is not
counted as a twin crisis.liberalization relaxes borrowing constraints and increases growth, but also generates systemic
risk which results in occasional crises. In Martin and Rey (2005), stock market liberalization
and ﬁnancial frictions in asset markets interact to generate either investment booms or
ﬁnancial crashes. In Dell’Arricia and Marquez (2004a, 2004b) ﬁnancial liberalization leads
to less screening by banks, which gives rise to boom-bust credit cycles.
Ranciere,Tornell, and Westermann (2003) develop a model where asymmetries between
the tradeable (T) and no-tradeable (N) sectors are key to understanding the link between
liberalization and growth. Because liberalization has not been accompanied by judicial
reform, severe contract enforceability problems have persisted in many developing economies.
While many T-sector ﬁrms can overcome these problems in a liberalized economy by accessing
international capital markets, most N-sector ﬁrms cannot. Thus N-sector ﬁrms are ﬁnancially
constrained and depend on domestic bank credit.
Financial liberalization induces higher growth by accelerating ﬁnancial deepening and
thus increasing the investment of ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms, most of which are in the
N-sector. However, the easing of ﬁnancial constraints is associated with the undertaking of
insolvency risk, which often takes the form of foreign currency denominated debt backed
by N-sector output. Insolvency risk arises because ﬁnancial liberalization not only lifts re-
strictions that preclude risk-taking, but is also associated with explicit and implicit systemic
bailout guarantees covering creditors against systemic crises. Not surprisingly, an important
share of capital inﬂows takes the form of risky ﬂows to the ﬁnancial sector, and the economy
as a whole experiences aggregate fragility and occasional crises.18
Rapid N-sector growth helps the T-sector grow faster by providing abundant and cheap
inputs. Thus, as long as a crisis does not occur, growth in a risky economy is more rapid
than it is in a safe one. Of course, ﬁnancial fragility implies that a self-fulﬁlling crisis may
occur. And, during a crisis, GDP growth falls and typically turns negative. Crises must be
rare, however, in order to occur in equilibrium–otherwise agents would not ﬁnd it proﬁtable
to take on credit risk in the ﬁrst place. Thus, average long-run growth may be faster along
a risky path than along a safe one.
Martin and Rey (2005) analyze the impact of stock market liberalization on capital ﬂows,
18For instance, the ratio of foreign liabilities to money in the banking sector, a measure often used to
proxy for currency mismatches, increased in Thailand from 50 percent in 1990 to 240 percent in 1996.asset prices and investment. They show that when there are transaction costs in international
assets, stock market liberalization can lead to two possible outcomes for an emerging market
economy. Under normal circumstances, liberalization performs the positive role of generat-
ing capital inﬂows, expanding diversiﬁcation opportunities and lowering the cost of capital,
thus leading to higher investment and growth. However, under certain circumstances, ”pes-
simistic” expectations about the state of the economy can be self-fulﬁlling, leading to a fall
in the demand for assets, capital outﬂows and ﬁnancial crashes associated with low invest-
ment and low growth. The key element for this mechanism to operate is that the decision
to invest by one agent inﬂuences the cost of capital of other investors through the impact of
that decision on income and the price of assets.
Dell’Arricia and Marquez (2004a, 2004b) propose a framework where ﬁnancial liberaliza-
tion leads to rapid lending development driven by a reduction in banks’ screening incentives.
In their model, banks’ incentives to screen potential borrowers come from adverse selection
among banks —banks screen to avoid ﬁnancing ﬁrms whose projects have been tested and
rejected by other banks. When ﬁnancial markets are liberalized and many new and untested
projects request funding, banks do not have strong incentives to screen their pool of ap-
plicants and rapid credit expansion ensues. In this case, ﬁnancial liberalization increases
investment and growth but also leads to a deterioration in the quality of the average bank’s
portfolio that will result in ﬁnancial fragility. At the macroeconomic level, as negative shocks
occur, ﬁnancial fragility will give way to ﬁnancial crises and output losses.
In the models discussed above ﬁnancial liberalization alleviates the consequences of cap-
ital market imperfections, but does so at the cost of increasing ﬁnancial fragility. Hence,
the overall eﬀect of ﬁnancial liberalization on growth is the result of a risk-return trade-oﬀ.
A ﬁnancially liberalized economy grows faster in normal times, but is exposed to severe
output contractions during ﬁnancial crises. The direct growth eﬀect dominates under two
conditions: First, ﬁnancial liberalization must strongly reduce ﬁnancial constraints and help
ﬁrms increase investment through higher leverage. Second, the frequency of ﬁnancial crises
must be low enough for risk-taking to pay oﬀ. The regression analysis presented in section
2 suggests that these two conditions are consistent with the data.4C o n c l u s i o n s
Several observers have claimed that ﬁnancial liberalization is not good for growth because
of the crises associated with it. This is, however, the wrong lesson to draw. Our empirical
analysis shows that ﬁnancial liberalization leads to faster average long-run growth, even
though it also leads to occasional crises.
We ﬁnd that in a large sample of countries, ﬁnancial liberalization typically leads to ﬁ-
nancial fragility and occasional ﬁnancial crises. In net terms, however, ﬁnancial liberalization
has led to faster long-run growth. Although crises are costly and have severe recessionary
eﬀects, they are rare events. Therefore, over the long run, the pro-growth eﬀects of greater
ﬁnancial deepening and more investment by far outweigh the detrimental growth eﬀects of
ﬁnancial fragility and a greater incidence of crises.
References
[1] Arellano, M., 2006, "Evaluation of Currency Regimes: The Unique Role of Sudden
Stops: Comments," Economic Policy, 45:119:152.
[2] Bekaert, G., C. Harvey, and R. Lundblad, 2005, “Does Financial Liberalization Spur
Growth?” Journal of Financial Economics, 77: 3-56.
[3] Caprio G. and D. Klingebiel, 2003, “Episodes of systemic and borderline Banking
Crises," mimeo The Worldbank.
[4] Demirguc-Kunt A and E. Detragiache, 1998, "Financial Liberalization and Financial
Fragility," IMF Working Paper 98/83.
[5] Dell’Ariccia, G. and R. Marquez, 2004a, “Lending Booms and Lending Standards.”
Mimeo, IMF.
[6] Dell’Ariccia, G., and R. Marquez, 2004b, “Information and Bank Credit Allocation.”
Journal of Financial Economics,7 2( 1 ) ,1 8 5 - 2 1 4 .
[7] Edwards, S. 2004, "Thirty Years of Current Account Imbalances", IMF Staﬀ Pa-
pers:51:1-47.[8] Gosh A., A-M Gulde and H. Wolfe, 2002, Exchange Rate Regimes: Choices and Conse-
quences,MIT Press.
[9] Glick R. and M. Hutchinson, 2001, "Banking Crises and Currency Crises: How Common
are the Twins," in Financial Crises in Emerging Markets, ed. by Glick, Moreno, and
Spiegel: New York: Cambridge University Press.
[10] Henry P., 2000, "Stock market liberalization, economic reform, and emerging market
equity prices," Journal of Finance 55, 529—564.
[11] Heckman, J.J.,1978, "Dummy Variables in a Simulateneous Equation System," Econo-
metrica, 46:931-960.
[12] Kaminsky, G. and Kaminsky, G. and C. Reinhart, 1999, “The Twin Crises: The Causes
of Banking and Balance of Payments Problems,” The American Economic Review,
89(3): 473-500
[13] Maddala G.S., 1983, :"Limited-Dependent and Qualitative Variables in Econometrics,"
Cambridge University Press
[14] Martin, P. and H. Rey, 2005, "Globalization and Emerging Markets: With or without
Crash", American Economic Review, forthcoming.
[15] Quinn,D.,1997,"The Correlates of Changes in International Financial Regulation,"
American Political Science Review,91:531—551.
[16] Ranciere R., Tornell A. and F. Westermann, 2003, "Crises and Growth: A Re-
evaluation," NBER WP10073.
[17] Razin, A. and Y Rubinstein, 2006, "Evaluation of Currency Regimes: The Unique Role
of Sudden Stops," Economic Policy, 45:119:152
[18] Wooldridge, 2002, Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data, MIT Press.Table 1:  Financial Liberalization, Crisis and Growth (I)
Estimation Technique: Treatment Effects Model, Two-Step Estimation
Robust Standard Errors Clustered at Country-Level
Frequency: Annual
Period of Estimation: 1980-2002
 [1] [2]
PANEL A: Growth Equation Coef. Coef.
Dependent Variable: Real Per Capita GDP Growth
 
Financial Liberalization Index 0.010 0.011
(de Jure [1]; de Facto [2]) (3.93)*** (3.42)***
Population Growth -0.64 -0.62
(5.38)*** (4.44)***




Openness to Trade 0.011 0.0096
(3.03)*** (2.47)***
Initial Real GDP per capita -0.019 -0.013
log(Real GDP per capita) in 1980 (1.72)* (0.95)
Twin Crisis Index -0.099 -0.11
(5.96)*** (3.42)***
First-Step Hazard 0.035 0.044
(4.7)*** (5.7)***
PANEL B: Crisis Probit Equation Coef. Coef.
Dependent Variable: Twin Crisis Index
    
Dummy Financial Liberalization 0.43 0.62
(2.01)** (2.88)***
Real Exchange Rate Overvaluation (lag) 1.82 3.67
(deviation from HP-trend) (3.43)*** (3.57)***
Real Exchange Rate Overvaluation (second lag) 1.31  
(deviation from HP-trend) (2.35)**  
Inflation (lag) 1.81 2.03
(4.93)*** (4.18)***





Aikaike Information Criterion Statistics 177.25 105.42
Number of Observations 1214 908
Number of Countries 60 44
Absolute value of z-statistics in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
 
16Table 3:  Financial Liberalization, Crisis and  Growth (II)
Estimation Technique: Treatment Effects Model, Two-Step Estimation
Robust Standard Errors Clustered at Country-Level
Frequency: non-overlapping five-year interval
Period of Estimation: 1981-2000
 [1] [2]
Growth Equation Coef. Coef.
Dependent Variable: Real Per Capita GDP Growth
 
Financial Liberalization Index 0.0120 0.0122
(de Jure [1]; de Facto [2]) (4.26)*** (2.22)**
Population Growth -0.98 -0.748
(4.03)*** (3.09)***




Openness to Trade 0.018 0.015
(2.86)*** (1.98)**
Initial Real GDP per capita -0.003 -0.0017
log(Real GDP per capita) in 1980 (1.49) (1.12)
Twin Crisis Index -0.174 -0.184
(4.82)*** (3.05)***
First Step Hazard 0.035 0.056
(2.5)** (2.08)**
Number of Observations 231 175
Number of Countries 60 44
Absolute value of z-statistics in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
 











































































































































































































Growth [Model] : Mean Fitted  Per Capita  Growth Rate after Liberalization - Mean
Per Capita Fitted Growth Rate before Liberalization
Cost of Crises : Expected Growth Effect of Financial Crises after Liberalization -
Expected Growth  Effect of  Financial Crises before Liberalization









































































































































































































Growth [Data] : Mean Per Capita  Growth Rate after
Liberalization - Mean Per Capita Growth Rate before
Liberalization
Growth [Model] : Mean Fitted  Per Capita  Growth Rate
after Liberalization - Mean Per Capita Fitted Growth Rate
before Liberalization
18Appendix A: Definitions and Sources of Variables Used in Regression Analysis
Variable Definition and Construction Source
De Jure Index  of Financial 
Liberalization 
Dummy variable based on the dates of official equity market 
liberalization corresponding  to formal regulatory changes after 
which foreign investors officially have the opportunity to invest 
in domestic equity securities.
Beckaert and Harvey (2005)
De Facto Index of  Financial 
Liberalization 
see Appendix B
Author's calculation using International 
Financial Statistics (2004)
Real GDP per capita Ratio of real gross domestic product over total population. Real 
growth domestic product is in constant local currency units. Author's calculation using International 
Financial Statistics (2004)
Real GDP per capita growth  Log difference of real GDP per capita. Author's calculation using International 
Financial Statistics (2004)
Inital Real GDP per capita Log of real GDP per capita in 1980 Author's calculation using International 
Financial Statistics (2004)
Twin Crisis Indicator Dummy Variable indicating a banking crisis and a currency crisis. Author’s calculations using data from Caprio 
and Klingebiel (2003) and  from Glick and 
Hutchison (2001)
Government Size Ratio of government consumption to GDP. World Development Indicator (2004).
Population Growth Growth rate of total population World Development Indicator (2004).
Inflation log(100+annual percent change in consumer price index).  Author’s calculations using data from 
International Financial Statistics  (2004)
Real Effective Exchange Rate  Multilateral real exchange rate based on trade partner's weights International Financial Statistics  (2004)
Real Exchange Rate 
Overvaluation
Difference between  real effective exchange rate and HP 
detrended real rffective rxchange rate  (Hodrick and Prescott 
filtering parameter: lambda=10
4)
Author’s calculations using data from 
International Financial Statistics  (2004)
Openness to Trade Residual of a regression of the log of the ratio of exports and 
imports (in 1995 US$) to GDP (in 1995 US$), on the logs of area 
and population, and dummies for oil exporting and for landlocked 
countries.
Author’s calculations with data from World 
Development Network (2002) and The World 
Bank (2004).
M2/Reserves Ratio of M2/total foreign reserves minus gold Author’s calculations using data from 
International Financial Statistics  (2004)
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Appendix  B: Construction of  the de facto Financial Liberalization Index 
 
It is a de facto index that signals the year when a country has liberalized. We construct the index by 
looking for trend-breaks in financial flows. We identify trend-breaks by applying the CUSUM test of 
Brown et. al. (1975) to the time trend of the data. This method tests for parameter stability based on 
the cumulative sum of the recursive residuals. To determine the date of financial liberalization we 
consider net cumulative capital inflows (KI).
1A country is financially liberalized (FL) at year t if: (i) 
KI has a trend break at or before t and there is at least one year with a KI-to-GDP ratio greater than 
5% at or before t, or (ii) its KI-to-GDP ratio is greater than 10% at or before t. The 5% and 10% 




When the cumulative sum of residuals starts to deviate from zero, it may take a few years until this 
deviation is statistically significant. In order to account for the delay problem, we choose the year 
where the cumulative sum of residuals deviates from zero, provided that it eventually crosses the 5% 
significance level.  The FL index does not allow for policy reversals: once a country liberalizes it 
never becomes close thereafter. Since our sample period is 1980-2000, we consider that our approach 







                                                 
1  We compute cumulative net capital inflows of non-residents since 1980. Capital inflows include FDI, 
portfolio flows and bank flows. The data series are from the IFS: lines 78BUDZF, 78BGDZF and 78BEDZ. For 
some countries not all three series are available for all years. In this case, we use the inflows to the banking 
system only, which is available for all country-years. 
2 If after liberalization a country suffers a sharp reversal in capital flows (like in a financial crisis), it might 
exhibit a second breakpoint. In our sample, however, this possibility is not present: the trend breaks due to 
crises are never large enough to show up in significant CUSUM test statistics. 
20Appendix C : List of Countries and  Dates of Financial Liberalization and Crises
De Jure Dates of Financial 
Liberalization
De Facto Dates of Financial  
Liberalization Dates of Twin Crisis
Algeria   * NA 1990-1991
Argentina 1989 1991 1982;1990-1991;2001-2002




Brazil 1991 1992 1998
Canada 1980 1980
Chile 1992 1984 1982;1985
Colombia 1991 1991
Costa Rica  
Cote d'Ivoire * NA
Denmark 1980 1980
Dominican  1996
Ecuador * NA 1999
Egypt, 1997 * NA
El Salvador * NA  








Indonesia 1989 1989 1997-1998
Ireland 1980 1980





Kenya  1993 1995
Korea, 1992 1993 1997-1998
Malaysia 1988 1990 1997-1998
Mexico 1989 1989 1982;1994-1995
Morocco 1997  
Netherlands 1980 1980
NewZealand 1987 1980
Nigeria 1995 * NA
Norway 1980 1980 1992-1993
Pakistan 1991   
Paraguay  
Peru    1988
Philippines 1991 * NA 1983;1997-1998
Portugal 1986 1986
South Africa 1992 * NA
Spain 1985 1986 1982
Sri Lanka 1992 * NA
Sweden 1980 1980 1992-1993
Switzerland 1980 1980
Thailand 1987 1988 1984 ;1997-1998;2000
Tunisia  
Turkey 1989 1990 1994 ;2001
United Kingdom 1980 1980
United States 1980 1980
Uruguay 1989 1982;2002
Venezuela 1990 * NA 1994-1996
*denotes countries in regression [1] using the  De Jure Index , but not in Regression [2] using De Facto Index
1980 means financially liberalized  before or in 1980. NA = not informed
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